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UNSETTLEDNESS IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW: BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE, CORPORATE PURPOSE*  
 




 This Article revisits two fundamental issues in corporate law.  
One—the central role of the business judgment rule in fiduciary 
litigation—involves a great deal of seemingly settled law, while the 
other—is there a mandated corporate purpose—has very little law.  
Using the emergent question of whether the business judgment rule 
should be used in analyzing officer and controlling shareholder fiduciary 
duties, the latter issue having recently been addressed by Chancellor 
Strine in the widely-heralded MFW decision, this Article proposes a 
fundamental rethinking of the rule’s analytical preeminence.  For a 
variety of reasons, it is suggested that fiduciary duties should be made 
more prominent and the business judgment rule should be dramatically 
deemphasized.  The policy rationales for the rule are sound, but they 
have no relevance for shareholders and introduce needless complexity.  
For directors, those rationales do not apply in the loyalty setting, and in 
the care setting, can be achieved by recalling simply that there is no 
substance to judicial review in that context. 
 As to corporate purpose, the Article advocates that Delaware 
law permit a pluralistic approach in the for-profit corporate sector.  
Long agnostic about ultimate corporate objective, Delaware law may 
have turned unnecessarily toward a strict shareholder primacy focus in 
the 2010 eBay decision.  To bring clarification and to foster flexibility, 
Professor Johnson recommends a legislative default provision, with an 
opt-out feature.  This feature should be in the business corporation 
statute itself.  Delaware’s new benefit corporation law laudably 
advances the goal of institutional pluralism, but does so at the ironic risk 
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of reinforcing a belief that business corporations themselves are legally 
permitted only to maximize profits.  Judges in a democratic society 
should not dictate institutional goals. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Apart from the Justices on the United States Supreme Court, it is 
hard to imagine that any judges in our country receive closer scrutiny 
than those serving on Delaware's courts.  This is due to their central role,1 
historically, in expounding corporate law and, more recently, in fleshing 
 
                                                                                                             
1Michael J. Maimone, Causes of Action, in DELAWARE SUPREME COURT GOLDEN 
ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at 53, 57 (The Honorable Justice Randy J. Holland & Helen L. 
Winslow eds., 2001) ("It is beyond dispute that the Supreme Court of Delaware is regarded as 
the  nation's leading arbiter of issues of corporate law."). 
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out the law of noncorporate business entities.2  Numerous dimensions of 
their business law jurisprudence have been scrupulously analyzed.3  
These include, to note just a few, the longstanding "race" debate over 
state and federal rivalry with Delaware4—both as to competitors' possible 
influence on Delaware law and also as to the preferred forum for 
chartering and for adjudicating disputes;5 the supposed substantive 
superiority (or inferiority) of Delaware law as compared to other states' 
laws;6 and the different philosophies underlying its noncorporate and 
 
                                                                                                             
2The limited liability company is rapidly emerging as the most popular business form 
for new companies.  Peter Walsh Jr. & Dominick T. Gattuso, Delaware LLCs - The Wave of 
the Future and Advising Your Clients About What to Expect, 19 BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 
2009, at 11; Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are The New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study of 
the Number of New LLCS, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States Between 2004-
2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
459, 459-60 (2010) ("The limited liability company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular 
form of new business entity in the United States.").  Both the Delaware Supreme Court and the 
Delaware Chancery Court are issuing more and more important opinions in the noncorporate 
area.  See, e.g., Gatz Props., LLC v. Auriga Capital Corp., 2012 WL 5425227 (Del. Nov. 7, 
2012). 
3See infra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.  
4For a fairly brief description of the origins of the "race to the bottom"/"race to the 
top" debate, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race to the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 
VA. L. REV. 685, 686-87 (2009) (describing briefly the origins of the race to the bottom/race to 
the top debate).  Cf. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for Small Fry: 
Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 93-95 
(2011) (explaining the "competition" debate now extends to limited liability companies).   
5See generally Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and 
Delaware's Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59-60 (2009) (discussing the 
preeminence in corporate law and the horizontal and vertical challenges it faces).  As to federal 
"competition" for Delaware, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
588, 592 (2003).  Recently, many commentators have observed that, with respect to Delaware 
corporations, plaintiffs frequently are filing litigation outside Delaware. E.g., Joseph A. 
Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection Clauses: An 
Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 344-45 n.57 (2012) ("[A]cademic research 
suggest that Delaware has been losing cases to other venues because plaintiff counsel 
perceives the Court of Chancery as an unfriendly jurisdiction.") (citing John Armour, Bernard 
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 42 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. Law 
Working Paper No. 151/2010, Nw. Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 10-03, 
Feb. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1578404)).  Thus, 
Delaware provides the governing substantive law, but Delaware courts may not be 
adjudicating these disputes.  Id.  This has led to proposals for ex ante resolution of this place of 
filing issue via forum selection clauses in a corporation's organic documents.  See Thomas T. 
McClendon, Note, The Power of a Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection Clauses by 
Delaware Corporations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2012). 
6See, e.g., William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's 
Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L.J. 1, 9-11 (2009) (introducing empirical evidence as to 
why Delaware is the leader for corporate charters); William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. 
Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery:  A Response to Professors Carney & Shepherd's "The 
Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success," 2009 U. ILL. L.J. 95, 97 (2009) (criticizing 
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corporate decisions.7  And of course, there is the age-old question of 
whether, in a particular case or line of cases, Delaware "got it right."  Or, 
as to an issue yet to be resolved, speculation as to whether they will "get 
it right." 
 This Article takes up certain issues in Delaware corporate law 
that are, as yet, unsettled.  But the Article also examines some issues in 
Delaware's law that, although ostensibly settled, nonetheless, to this 
Author at least, remain unsettling and worth revisiting.  The Article 
addresses issues in Delaware's substantive corporate law itself.  It does 
not tackle issues about that law (or Delaware's courts) in relation to 
procedural matters or to developments or institutions outside Delaware.8    
 The aim—in this ideal venue for exchanging ideas among the 
bench, bar, and academic communities that, along with the General 
Assembly, comprise the commonwealth of Delaware corporate law—is 
to raise some first-order questions.  Ultimately, judges must express the 
resolution of fundamental issues in doctrinal terms, their lingua franca.9  
Consequently, this Article will also attend to matters of legal doctrine in 
Delaware law.  The larger point, however, is about Delaware corporate 
law as a highly adaptive and dynamic social institution, notwithstanding 
the apparently settled nature of core precepts. 
 Delaware's leadership in corporate law is not just the result of its 
well-established body of precedent, its highly regarded judiciary, or its 
supposed tilt (or lack thereof, depending on one's viewpoint) toward 
management or investors.10  Delaware's bench also has the advantages of 
having so many opportunities to address critical corporate law issues,11 
the certainty of immediate and sustained scrutiny and feedback from 
lawyers and scholars, and the deft lever of equity that permits judges, as 
a lawmaking mechanism, to stand between the categorical edicts of a 
                                                                                                             
Carney and Shepherd's analysis about the indeterminacy of Delaware law). 
7See Lyman Johnson, Delaware's Non-waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 701, 705-08 
(2011) (describing the more contractarian approach of Delaware noncorporate law as 
compared to its corporate law). 
8See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.  A recent example is the 2012 federal 
court ruling holding unconstitutional a Delaware provision by which judges on the Chancery 
Court serve as arbitrators.  Del. Coal. for Open Gov't v. Strine, 2012 WL 3744718 (D. Del. 
Aug. 30, 2012). 
9See Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua 
Franca: Evidence from VC-Backed Startups 2 (Harv. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 12-38, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117967 ("Delaware law can be expected to serve 
as a 'lingua franca':  firms seeking out-of-state investors will be more likely to use Delaware 
law so they can provide a common language to all their investors.").  
10See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
11More than 50% of all U. S. publicly-traded companies, and 63% of the Fortune 500 
are incorporated in Delaware.  Division of Corporations, ST. OF DEL., 
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited April 10, 2013). 
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legislative/regulatory state and pure, unconstrained private ordering.12  To 
do the latter effectively, and in a way congruent with shifting 
expectations of corporate behavior in a democratic society, requires an 
enormous capacity for professional introspection, engagement with the 
larger corporate community, and a willingness to rethink and possibly 
remold prior rulings, in the light of experience. 
 This Article is organized into four parts and takes up, broadly, 
two issues.  The first involves a subject on which, in general, there is a 
great deal of law in Delaware, but not on two related and emerging sub-
issues.  The second pertains to a topic on which there is virtually no law.  
In particular, Part II explores whether the cornerstone doctrine of 
Delaware law—the business judgment rule—should play a central role in 
adjudicating the still nascent (and unsettled) areas of officer's and 
controlling shareholder's duties and liability.  Those two topics also, 
however, are a useful lens to raise a more general issue:  Should the 
business judgment rule, rather than fiduciary duties themselves, really 
remain the central analytical construct in Delaware corporate law?  This 
Article provides several reasons why the business judgment rule should 
recede in prominence in favor of emphasizing fiduciary duties.  Only 
Delaware's courts can settle this issue. 
 Part III addresses the always nettlesome issue of corporate 
purpose.  Specifically, does Delaware law currently—and, relatedly, 
should Delaware law—mandate a particular corporate purpose?  Or, is 
law—and should it remain—rightly agnostic on that baseline issue?  
After briefly considering certain theoretical and doctrinal failings on 
corporate purpose, the Article extensively reviews the 2010 Delaware 
Court of Chancery decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 
appearing to mandate profit maximization.13  It will be suggested that 
eBay wrongly espouses a narrow, singular objective for corporate 
endeavor that lacks authoritative support.  At best, and somewhat 
remarkably, existing positive law is still sufficiently unclear in 2013 that 
a statutory solution, via a default purpose and optional opt-outs, is 
advisable.  Without a statutory "fix," or timely clarification by the 
Delaware Supreme Court, Delaware law might be interpreted as 
imposing an undesirable monism of corporate purpose at a time when, in 
 
                                                                                                             
12For a description of equity's unique constitutional status in Delaware, see Johnson, 
supra note 7, at 703.  For a recent example of the dynamic character of Delaware lawmaking 
in the fiduciary duty area, see Lyman Johnson, Dynamic, Virtuous Fiduciary Regulation (U. of 
St. Thomas [Minnesota] Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-23, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2273869.   
1316 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
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corporate law as elsewhere, institutional pluralism should be encouraged.  
If Delaware's courts will not rectify this issue—as they can—the General 
Assembly should, and it should do so within the business corporation 
statute itself, not merely by enacting a new "public benefit" corporation 
statute as it has recently done.  Part IV is a brief conclusion. 
II.  RETRENCHING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The business judgment rule has long been the cornerstone 
concept in Delaware corporate law.14  To suggest its retrenchment in a 
lecture attended by many of Delaware's eminent judges and leading 
members of its elite corporate bar—and in an article published in 
Delaware's premier law journal—might seem an act of legal sacrilege.  
Some might liken it to visiting the Vatican with the intention of giving 
the Pope a copy of Luther's small catechism,15 or Calvin's Institutes of the 
Christian Religion.16  It is not intended in that way, but rather in the spirit 
of Holmes's famous observation that "[i]t is revolting to have no better 
reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry 
IV."17  Any rule of law, however old and established, must continue to 
serve its intended purposes or it should be discarded, stare decisis 
notwithstanding.  At a minimum, it is useful from time to time to take up 
settled matters, if only to reaffirm them as not having outlived their 
usefulness.  Moreover, the business judgment rule is well established as a 
mainstay doctrine in Delaware only with respect to corporate directors, 
not with respect to officers or controlling shareholders.18  This Part, after 
very briefly describing what is settled about the business judgment rule, 
turns to the far less settled areas of its application to officers and 
 
                                                                                                             
14See Rodman Ward & Paul J. Lockwood, Corporate Law, in DELAWARE SUPREME 
COURT GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at 82 (The Honorable Justice Randy J. Holland & 
Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001) (tracing the business judgment rule concept in Delaware back to 
decisions from 1912, 1924, and 1935); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) 
(citing precedent); Krasnick v. Pac. E. Corp., 180 A. 604, 607 (Del. Ch. 1935); Robinson v. 
Pitt. Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del. Ch. 1924); Bryan v. Aikin, 82 A. 817, 820 (Del. Ch. 
1912), rev'd, 86 A. 674, 687 (Del. 1913). 
15Martin Luther, The Small Catechism of Dr. Martin Luther (Rev. H. Wetzel ed., 
trans., 1872) (1529). 
16JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (Henry Beveridge trans., 
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc. 2008) (1536). 
17Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).  
This passage was quoted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Keeler v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 
672 A.2d 1012, 1017 n.6 (Del. 1996). 
18All of the old decisions cited by Mr. Ward, supra note 14, involve corporate 
directors. 
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controlling shareholders before reflecting more generally on how the rule 
and fiduciary duties might be sensibly realigned in all three areas—
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders. 
A. The Settled Business Judgment Rule for Corporate Directors 
 Doctrinally, the business judgment rule "is a presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company."19  That 1984 formulation, 
however, is only one of three constitutive strands of the rule, specifically, 
the procedural guide.20  Another aspect stems from the 1993 effort to link 
analytically the business judgment rule and fiduciary duties.21  There, the 
Delaware Supreme Court stated that to rebut the rule's Aronson 
presumption, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead a breach of fiduciary 
duty, whereupon the burden shifts to defendant directors to prove the 
entire fairness of a transaction.22  This is the rule-duty linkage strand.23  If 
a plaintiff fails to carry that burden, the substantive dimension of the rule 
"attaches" to protect director decisions because courts will not "second-
guess" business judgments.24  This last "substantive" law strand of the 
rule stems, in its current formulation, from the 1971 decision in Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Levien.25  Thus, although well established, the contours of 
the business judgment rule have been altered over the years and now 
encompass refinements from the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 
 Clearly, moreover, the decisional law focus is on directors.26  
This is seen not only in existing doctrine, but also in well-known policy 
 
                                                                                                             
19Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); Aronson, 473 A.2d 
at 812. 
20See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
21Id. at 361-62. 
22Id.  See Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (affirming the 
procedural and the rule-duty linkage strands of the business judgment rule announced in Cede 
& Co.). 
23See Gantler, 965 A.2d at 706. 
24Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361.  
25280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (director business judgment will not be overturned if 
it "can be attributed to any rational purpose").  See also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Corp., 651 A.2d 
1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 
(Del. 1985)).  Prior to Sinclair, as enhanced by Aronson, Delaware courts would not interfere 
with business judgments unless there was "gross and palpable overreaching," or equivalent 
conduct.  E.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970) (quoting Meyerson 
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967)). 
26See infra Part II.D (discussing the business judgment rule and director conduct). 
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rationales for the rule.27  Delaware courts frequently ground the rule in 
that section of the corporate statute providing that the business and 
affairs of a corporation are to be managed by or under the direction of its 
board.28  This is a director-centered rationale.29  Another rationale is to 
induce qualified persons to serve as directors and to more closely align 
director attitudes toward risk—they will capture little of the eventual 
payoff from success but face litigation exposure from failure—with 
stockholder risk preferences as influenced by holding a diversified 
portfolio of stock.30  A third rationale emphasizes that judges, as public 
officials, unlike directors, are not business experts; and directors, not 
judges, are elected by stockholders.31  These rationales coalesce to form 
the rule's "powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the 
directors."32 
 Moving beyond doctrine and policy to history, one finds that the 
business judgment rule became a key feature of Delaware's jurisprudence 
long before the duty of care.33  This history is well traced by Justice 
Henry Ridgely Horsey in a lecture delivered at Widener University 
School of Law and later published as an article in this journal.34  Justice 
Horsey confessed to being surprised at finding that it was only in 1963 
that the Delaware Supreme Court came to "first recognize the existence 
of a director's fiduciary duty to act in an informed and prudent manner, 
 
                                                                                                             
27See Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty Of Finest Loyalty And 
Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule In Unincorporated Business 
Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 350-51 (2005) (discussing justifications for the 
business judgment rule). 
28See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012); see, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360; 
Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989).  See also In re 
Cox Commc'ns S'holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614 (Del. Ch. 2005) (explaining the business 
judgment rule "exemplifies and animates" centralized management in the form of a 
corporation's board of directors and the subordinate officers chosen by directors). 
29See, e.g., In re Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 614 ("It would not be much of a stretch 
to say that the central idea of Delaware's approach to corporation law is the empowerment of 
centralized management, in the form of boards of directors and the subordinate officers they 
choose, to make disinterested business decisions."). 
30See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).  Former 
Chancellor William Allen describes the rule as seeking to overcome a director inclination 
toward "sub-optimal risk acceptance."  Id. at 1052-53.  
31See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 439, 456-57 (2005) (collecting authority).  
32Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
33See Justice Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware 
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 985, 995 (1994) (explaining that the 
business judgment rule has been part of corporate law for at least 150 years) (citing S. Samuel 
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 (1979-1980)).   
34Id. 
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i.e., with due care."35  The essence of the business judgment rule, of 
course, had been around for decades before that.36 
 Taking the doctrines in the historic order in which they had 
emerged, Justice Horsey in both his 1994 scholarly article and his 
contemporaneously written 1993 judicial opinion in Cede,37 linked the 
duty of care with the business judgment rule by making the former a 
"component"38 or an "element"39 of the latter.  In this way, reflecting 
Holmes's insight that the life of the common law's development is not 
always logic, but experience,40 the duty of care, for corporate directors at 
least, became doctrinally embedded in the still regnant business 
judgment rule only about 20 years ago.41  The business judgment rule, 
first to arrive on the Delaware legal scene, remained predominant, with 
the director duty of care (and the duty of loyalty) being subsumed within 
it.42 
B. The Unsettled Issue of the Business Judgment Rule and Corporate 
Officers 
 Surprisingly, given Delaware's extensive corporate law 
jurisprudence, it is not settled today whether in cases involving corporate 
officers, judges will doctrinally deploy the business judgment rule in the 
same all-encompassing manner that it has been used for corporate 
directors.43  Delaware courts have stated in dicta that the rule covers 
officers,44 but they have not held it to be so applicable, nor have they 
 
                                                                                                             
35Id. at 985 (citing Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963)).  Two years before Graham, however, Chancellor Seitz had held corporate directors 
liable for failing in their duty to exercise, in a case involving no business judgment, "a 
reasonable discharge of their duties."  Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381, 395 (Del. Ch. 1961).  The 
duty of care was even more forthrightly expressed in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
872-73 (Del. 1985) (distinguishing care from loyalty). 
36See supra note 14. 
37See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
38Horsey, supra note 33, at 989, 991, 997. 
39Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361, 366. 
40Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (1881). 
41Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61.  
42See id. at 360 (referring to the duty of loyalty and the duty of care strands of the 
business judgment rule). 
43Johnson, supra note 31, at 440-41. 
44Id. at 443-47 (discussing cases).  See also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist 
Sparks III, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 
60 BUS. LAW. 865, 865 (2005) (stating that the "policy rationales underlying the development 
and application of the business judgment rule" warrant its application to officers as well as 
directors). 
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analytically linked it to fiduciary duties as they did with respect to 
directors in the Cede framework.  Consequently, they also have had no 
occasion to fully consider the policy case for and against application of 
the rule to officers.45 
 In fact, in the 2009 decision of Gantler v. Stephens,46 a case of 
first impression on officer duties, the Court rather obviously did not 
subsume the duty of care under, or even mention, the business judgment 
rule in its treatment of officers.  Importantly, the Court stated that while 
it had earlier "implied that officers of Delaware corporations, like 
directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary 
duties of officers are the same as those of directors . . . [w]e now 
explicitly so hold."47  Conspicuously absent in its analysis of officer 
duties, however, was the business judgment rule.48  Thus, in Gantler, 
after applying the usual analytical framework of requiring plaintiffs to 
overcome the presumptions of the business judgment rule for directors,49 
by way of contrast, the Court straightforwardly found, with respect to 
officers, that the plaintiff's allegations "state a claim that they breached 
their fiduciary duties as officers."50 
 Although neither the doctrinal nor policy aspects of the business 
judgment rule have been settled with respect to officers, on the historical 
front officers strikingly differ from directors.51  Recall that for directors in 
Delaware the business judgment rule emerged well before full 
articulation of the duty of care.52  Consequently, perhaps out of a belief 
that the newer concept should be engrafted onto the older (rather than 
vice versa) director fiduciary duties became "elements" or "components" 
 
                                                                                                             
45For contrasting views on this issue, compare Johnson, supra note 31, at 452, 462-69 
(advocating against an application of the business judgment rule to officers), with Hamermesh 
& Sparks, supra note 44, at 865 (advocating for an application of the business judgment rule to 
officers). 
46965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
47Id. at 708-09. 
48See id. at 708-09 (holding plaintiffs had stated claim that defendants breached their 
fiduciary duties as officers without discussing the business judgment rule in reference to the 
officers). 
49Id. at 708. 
50Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709.  See Michael Follett, Gantler v. Stephens:  Big Epiphany 
or Big Failure?  A Look at the Current State of Officers' Fiduciary Duties and Advice for 
Potential Protection, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 563, 565-66, 582 (2010) (business judgment rule for 
officers unresolved). 
51Follett, supra note 50, at 566-69 (discussing the different duties between officers and 
directors and whether the courts should grant officers protection under the business judgment 
rule). 
52See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
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of the business judgment rule in 1993.53  But in Gantler, the fiduciary 
duties of officers emerged prior to the business judgment rule, which has 
not yet been adopted for officers in Delaware.54  Therefore, with respect 
to officers, in Delaware there is currently no pre-existing historical, 
policy, or doctrinal connection between fiduciary duties and the business 
judgment rule, as is the case with directors.55  Put another way, at least 
for now, Gantler momentarily has properly placed the fiduciary duty 
horse in front of the business judgment rule cart, not behind it, as in 
Cede.56  The unsettled issue is whether Delaware law eventually will, for 
officers, follow the approach adopted for directors and subsume duties 
within the rule or, conversely, not do so and, in fact, use officers as a 
timely occasion to reconsider the linkage earlier made for directors.  
Before addressing that, the unsettled (and unsettling) relationship of the 
business judgment rule to controlling shareholders will be treated, 
because it helpfully illuminates precisely the same issue. 
C. The Unsettling Issue of the Business Judgment Rule and 
Controlling Shareholders 
 If the future application of the business judgment rule to officers 
remains unsettled, the possible application of it to controlling 
shareholders is unsettling.  The deployment of the business judgment 
rule in the shareholder setting seemed to first appear in the late 1960s.57  
It was then more or less suppressed for controlling shareholders in the 
1990s in favor of uniformly using an entire fairness standard where self-
dealing is involved;58 now it may be on the verge of more generally re-
appearing, particularly in light of Chancellor Strine's recent and 
important opinion in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation.59  This Article 
does not dispute the various policy considerations favoring a more 
deferential approach to controlling shareholder conduct under certain 
 
                                                                                                             
53See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.  
54See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.  This issue is taking on renewed 
importance given recent federal rulings in California that the business judgment rule does not 
apply to officers.  See FDIC v. Perry, 2012 WL 589569, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012); FDIC 
v. Hawker, 2012 WL 2068773, at *7 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2012).  But see FDIC v. Briscoe, No. 
1:11-cv-02303-SCJ (N.D. Ga. Aug. 14, 2012).  See generally John Jenkins, But I Just Work 
Here!:  The Rise of Corporate Officer Fiduciary Liability, 6 DEAL LAWYERS 1 (Nov.-Dec. 
2012) (discussing scholarship and case law). 
55See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
56This is elaborated on in infra Part II.D.  
57See infra Part II.C.1.  
58See infra Part II.C.2. 
59See infra Part II.C.3. 
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conditions, but the business judgment rule is not the appropriate doctrinal 
vehicle for implementing that approach.  Thus, as is the case with 
officers, the possible re-emergence of the rule in the controlling 
shareholder context offers a timely occasion to re-consider the larger 
utility of the rule in framing Delaware's fiduciary duty analysis.  This 
will be taken up after first tracing the rule's fleeting but possibly re-
emergent role in the shareholder setting. 
1. The Appearance of the Business Judgment Rule 
 Delaware courts traditionally examined business dealings 
between a controlling shareholder—frequently a parent corporation—and 
the controlled company using a strict entire (or intrinsic) fairness test.60  
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp. and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical 
Corp. are widely cited 1952 decisions that did so, and neither mentioned 
the business judgment rule.61  In 1970, however, the Delaware Supreme 
Court introduced the business judgment rule into its analysis of 
transactions involving controlling shareholders.62 
 In Getty Oil Company v. Skelly Oil Company,63 the Court recited 
that the proper test for parent-subsidiary dealings was fairness,64 but 
stated that there were two tests "to determine the limits of             
'fairness' . . . ."65  Citing Sterling,66 the Court first referred to the "'intrinsic 
fairness'" test,67 but then also referred to the "'business judgment' test,"68 
the latter being applicable where the terms of a transaction are set by a 
third party, not the parent.69  As support for the latter proposition, the 
Court cited a 1967 Delaware Court of Chancery decision, Meyerson v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co.70  The court in Meyerson acknowledged that the 
 
                                                                                                             
60See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-110 (Del. 1952); 
Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (Del. Ch. 1952); accord David J. Greene & 
Co. v. Dunhill Int'l., Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968). 
61David J. Greene & Co., 249 A.2d at 430. 
62See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970). 
63Id. 
64Id. at 886. 
65Id. at 887. 
6693 A.2d at 107. 
67267 A.2d at 887 (finding that fairness standard would be met through a transaction 
reached as though each party exerted bargaining power at arm's length). 
68Id. 
69Id. (observing in the special context of that case that the third party is "usually the 
State or Federal Government").  
70246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch. 1967). See also Wolfunsohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 
A.2d 72, 76 (Del. 1969) (holding that a finding of overreaching is necessary to prevail against 
a parent of a subsidiary). 
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proper test for parent-subsidiary dealings was fairness, but considered the 
arm's length measure to be meaningless in parent-subsidiary dealings, 
and thus the court observed that the question "is reduced to one of 
business judgment with which the court should not interfere . . . ."71  
Relying on this approach, the Getty Court also noted, however, that one 
basis for interfering with business judgment is an advantage obtained by 
the controlling shareholder to the disadvantage of the subsidiary or its 
minority shareholders.72  The court in Getty found no advantage accruing 
to the parent in relation to the subsidiary or its minority stockholders and, 
therefore, held that there was no warrant for the court to interfere.73 
 The following year, the Delaware Supreme Court sought to 
clarify the relationship between the entire fairness and business judgment 
standards in the shareholder context.74  In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,75 
the Court stated that the intrinsic fairness standard did not apply to all 
parent-subsidiary dealings, but only those where there was "self-
dealing"—i.e., where the "parent causes the subsidiary to act in such a 
way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the 
exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders . . . ."76  
Critically, however, the Court observed that, where self-dealing is 
absent, then the business judgment standard is to be applied to 
transactions involving controlling shareholders;77 the Court also 
reiterated the pertinence of that standard for corporate directors.78  Thus it 
is that the business judgment rule standard came to be applied to 
controlling shareholders.  But the reason is not so much that a 
compelling case for the rule was ever made, or even considered.  Rather, 
the rule was then seen as the only available doctrinal alternative to the 
much stricter fairness standard.79 
 After Sinclair, absent self-dealing by a controlling shareholder, 
the business judgment rule became the generally applicable or "default" 
standard.80  Consequently, a rule originally designed for corporate 
 
                                                                                                             
71246 A.2d at 794. 
72267 A.2d at 887. 
73Id. at 888. 
74Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720-22 (Del. 1971). 
75Id. 
76Id. at 720. 
77Id. 
78Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720. 
79See id. 
80See generally Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review In 
Conflict Transactions On Motions To Dismiss:  Lessons Learned In The Past Decade, 36 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 967, 998-1003 (2011) (illustrating through case studies that the presumption of the 
business judgment rule is standard under Delaware law unless rebutted).  But see Frank v. 
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directors and rooted in policy rationales specifically tailored to the 
statutory role of corporate directors in company governance took hold in 
the 1970s in the controlling shareholder context. 
2. The Suppression of the Business Judgment Rule 
 Although the business judgment rule after Sinclair became the 
default standard for reviewing a transaction where a controlling 
shareholder did not self-deal,81 the question arose as to whether there was 
some other way to invoke that relaxed standard instead of entire fairness, 
even where there was self-dealing.82  This was particularly true after two 
mid-1980s Delaware Supreme Court decisions reaffirming application of 
the demanding entire fairness test with a corresponding burden of proof 
shift.83  After some uncertainty at the Delaware Court of Chancery level,84 
the Delaware Supreme Court held in 1994 that entire fairness—not 
business judgment rule review—was the only applicable standard.85  And 
this was true even if the self-dealing transaction was approved by a 
properly functioning committee of independent directors with real 
bargaining power or was approved by a vote of a majority of the 
minority shareholders.86  Either of those approval mechanisms could 
effectuate a shift in the burden of proof from defendants to plaintiff, but 
would not lead to business judgment rule review.87  Thus, having been 
unleashed into the controlling shareholder area, application of the 
business judgment rule to controlling shareholder transactions had, by 
1994, become severely restricted in key settings. 
                                                                                                             
Elgamal, 2012 WL 1096090, at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 30, 2012) (entire fairness standard where no 
self-dealing by controlling shareholder but where latter derived benefit from and could veto 
transaction with nonaffiliated party). 
81Frank, 2012 WL 1096090, at *7-*8.  The rule also is typically applied where a non-
controlling stockholder's conduct is challenged.  Id. 
82See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983).  See also 
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (discussing the entire fairness 
standard). 
83Id. 
84Compare In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1988 WL 111271, at 
*884-*85 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) (providing a possible application of business judgment 
review), with Citron v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 499-500 (Del. Ch. 
1990) (addressing the entire fairness standard). 
85Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994).  For a recent 
reaffirmation of this approach by the Supreme Court, see Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 
51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012). 
86Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117. 
87Id. at 1116.  The Court in Kahn did not consider the effect of deploying both 
approval mechanisms on the standard of review.  See infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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3.  The Possible Re-Emergence of the Business Judgment Rule 
 The possible application of the business judgment rule standard 
even to self-dealing transactions by controlling shareholders has emerged  
in certain Delaware Court of Chancery decisions.88  In In re Cox 
Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, then-Vice Chancellor 
Strine addressed two policy concerns arising under the Lynch entire 
fairness review standard.89  First, he noted the value of creating an 
incentive for transactional planners to use the deal structure that is most 
advantageous to minority shareholders.90  Second, he explained the 
importance of providing defendants with a meaningful option to get rid 
of nonmeritorious cases short of trial.91 
 The chief hindrance to both of these was the entire fairness test 
which, even with a burden of proof shift resulting from independent 
committee or minority shareholder approvals, made it virtually 
impossible for defendants to gain a pre-trial dismissal.92  Emphasizing 
that Lynch had not foreclosed use of the business judgment rule standard 
where both an independent negotiating committee and approval by a 
majority of minority shareholders were used,93 Strine noted that such 
"double approvals" would benefit minority shareholders.94  To incentivize 
their salutary use in structuring transactions ex ante, Strine suggested that 
self-dealing "going private" mergers be accorded business judgment rule 
review where the controlling shareholder proposed a deal subject, from 
inception, to both approval mechanisms.95  Moreover, in any ensuing 
litigation, defendants could then obtain a pre-trial dismissal unless 
"plaintiffs pled particularized facts that the committee was not 
independent, or was ineffective because of its own fiduciary duty breach 
or wrongdoing by the controller (e.g., fraud on the committee)[,]" or 
 
                                                                                                             
88In re MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013); In re 
CNX Gas Corp. S'holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 400 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc. 
S'holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 606 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
89879 A.2d at 606-07. 
90Id.  This point was repeated several times by Chancellor Strine in the 2013 MFW 
decision.  MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *4, *20, *21. 
91Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607.  The Supreme Court in Theriault held that, 
prospectively, "if the record does not permit a pretrial determination that defendants are 
entitled to a burden shift," the defendants will retain the burden throughout the trial.  Americas 
Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1243 (Del. 2012). 
92Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607, 617. 
93Id. at 617. 
94Id. at 642. 
95Id. at 643-44. 
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because the approval by minority shareholders was somehow tainted.96 
 Seeking to reconcile his doctrinal suggestion with the rules 
governing so-called Siliconix tender offer freeze-outs,97 Strine proposed 
extending it into that setting as well.98  This proposal was subsequently 
considered at length by Vice Chancellor Laster in his 2010 decision in In 
re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation.99  As Strine had five years 
earlier,100 Laster cited extensive academic commentary addressing this 
issue,101 and he agreed that Strine's suggestion was the "coherent and 
correct approach."102  He also made the doctrinal point that using both 
approval mechanisms (i.e., an effective independent committee and 
minority stockholder approval) meant that, essentially, the controller 
only stood on "one side of the transaction,"103 thus removing the predicate 
of standing on "both sides of a transaction" that, stemming from Sterling 
and Sinclair,104 underlies the demanding entire fairness standard.105 
 However astute the analyses of Chancellor Strine and Vice-
Chancellor Laster, the Cox and CNX cases did not squarely present the 
issue of whether using both an independent committee and a majority-of-
the minority provision would result in business judgment rule review.106  
That changed in MFW, where the issue was squarely posed for the first 
time to Chancellor Strine.107  In a very careful and scholarly opinion, 
Chancellor Strine drew heavily on, and further elaborated on, his earlier 
analysis in Cox.108  He held that when a controlling shareholder merger 
has, from the outset, "been subject to (i) negotiation and approval by a 
special committee of independent directors fully empowered to say no, 
and (ii) approval by an uncoerced, fully informed vote of a majority of 
the minority investors, the business judgment rule standard of review 
 
                                                                                                             
96Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 644. 
97See In re Pure Res., Inc., S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 437 (Del. Ch. 2002); In re 
Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., 2001 WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001), reprinted in 
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1020 (2002). 
98Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 607, 646. 
994 A.3d 397, 414 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
100Cox Commc'ns, 879 A.2d at 618 n.34, 624 n.50, 625 n.52, 644 n.85. 
101CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 407 n.4, 409 n.5. 
102Id. at 414. 
103Id. at 412.  This also somewhat harkens back to the Getty reference to a "third 
party" presence as permitting business judgment review.  See supra notes 62-73 and 
accompanying text. 
104Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (Del. 1952); Sinclair Oil Corp. 
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
105CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 410-11 n.7 (citing authority). 
106In re MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2013). 
107Id. at *1.  
108Id. at *20 n.140. 
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applies."109  Finding those conditions to have been met, Chancellor Strine 
reviewed the transaction under the business judgment rule standard, 
found that standard to have been met by the controlling shareholder, and 
granted summary judgment to all defendants.110 
 Chancellor Strine's analysis did not differ for the controlling 
shareholder and the directors.111  Strikingly, for purposes of this Article, 
Chancellor Strine did not consider whether, given that the dual approval 
mechanisms had spared all defendants a strict entire fairness review, an 
alternative review standard other than "business judgment" review would 
better suit a controlling shareholder whose conduct is attacked.112  
Specifically, as in Gantler for officers,113 Chancellor Strine might have 
straightforwardly asked, with respect to the controlling shareholder, 
whether plaintiffs could proffer any evidence that the shareholder had 
breached a fiduciary owed to them.  Failing that, as plaintiffs did, 
warranted entry of summary judgment.114  The cumbersome business 
judgment rule edifice did not need to be introduced into the MFW 
analysis because it not only added nothing, it is not designed for, nor are 
its policy underpinnings aimed at, shareholders. 
 The reasoning and conclusions reached in all of these Delaware 
Court of Chancery decisions are impressive and persuasive.  But moving 
away from entire fairness review in the going private setting (or any self-
dealing context) in favor of a more deferential approach to achieve 
laudable policy objectives simply does not necessarily mean a business 
judgment rule framework should be adopted.  Instead, in a manner 
similar to the approach taken by Gantler with respect to corporate 
officers,115 the Delaware Supreme Court should, notwithstanding 
Chancellor Strine's use of the rule in MFW, consider this controlling 
 
                                                                                                             
109Id. at *4.  The pertinent language derived from this case states: 
 The business judgment rule is only invoked if: (i) the controller 
conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a special 
committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the special 
committee is independent; (iii) the special committee is empowered to freely 
select its own advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the special committee 
meets its duty of care; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there 
is no coercion of the minority. 
Id. at *25. 
110MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25.  The defendants were a 
controlling shareholder and the directors of the to-be-merged corporation.  Id. at *1. 
111Id. at *1-*2. 
112Id. at *20. 
113See supra text accompanying notes 46-50. 
114See MFW S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25. 
115See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. 
422 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
shareholder issue as a straightforward matter of fiduciary duty.  In other 
words:  Has the plaintiff sufficiently pled a duty of care breach 
(extremely unlikely with respect to a shareholder) or a duty of loyalty 
breach?  The business judgment rule—designed for directors, rooted in 
their plenary governance role, and central there only because of 
history—should be bypassed here.  To speak of "business judgment" in 
the shareholder context is incoherent because such a shareholder makes 
no "business" judgment on behalf of the corporation in the same statutory 
way directors do.  To be sure, in a third party merger, shareholder 
approval is necessary to effectuate the merger, but shareholders in that 
settingcontrolling or otherwiseowe no fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and other shareholders.116  Instead, they can and do vote 
based on whether, to them as investors, the merger is financially 
beneficial.117  When minority shareholders similarly are empowered 
under a majority-of-the-minority provision in a controlling shareholder 
self-dealing merger, they too lack fiduciary duties, can vote based on 
self-interest, and are not required to advance the company's best interests 
or those of any other person.118  And when the ostensibly controlling 
shareholder in that setting votes on the merger, it does not "control" the 
outcome given the dual approval mechanisms and it properly and likely 
votes its own financial investor interests.   
The issue of the best interests of the corporation is a matter of 
concern only for directors.  Moreover, there simply is no reason to 
require a "rational business purpose" in reviewing the conduct of a 
shareholder who does not act for the company or breach a fiduciary duty.  
Chancellor Strine did so, however, because he saw the business judgment 
rule construct as the only alternative to entire fairness.119  That inquiry, 
however, is simply inapt for examining shareholder conduct. 
 In the Lynch, MFW, and Siliconix settings, the underlying 
concern is whether the controlling shareholder discharges its duty of 
loyalty as it seeks to gain for itself complete ownership of the stock (or 
other advantage) to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.120  
 
                                                                                                             
116See In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1040-41 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
117See id. ("[T]he duty to put the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders 
above any interest . . . not shared by the stockholders generally does not mean that the 
controller has to subrogate his own interests so that the minority stockholders can get the deal 
that they want." (internal quotations omitted)). 
118See id. 
119See MFW S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *16. 
120Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Del. 1994); MFW 
S'holders Litig., 2013 WL 2436341, at *25; In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., 2001 WL 
716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2001), reprinted in 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1020-21 
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Although taking different transactional paths, only one of which involves 
classic self-dealing, both forms implicate the hallmark of loyalty—"the 
need to protect minority stockholders . . . ."121  Triggered by the desire of 
the controller to gain something from, or to the detriment of, the 
minority, the duty of loyalty would, as a default standard, require the 
controller to prove the entire fairness of the transaction.122  However, if as 
Chancellor Strine proposed in Cox Communications, and squarely held in 
MFW,123 the controller conditions the proposal from the outset on the dual 
approval mechanisms, then ex ante the controller presumptively fulfills 
its duty of loyalty subject only to ex post allegations of fiduciary 
wrongdoing by the independent committee or tainted approval by the 
minority shareholders, as to which the plaintiff has the burden.124  The 
conduct of the committee members themselves, moreover, provided they 
truly were independent and properly-functioning, would, because they 
are directors, receive traditional business judgment rule review.  
Maybe… 
D.  The Business Judgment Rule and Review of Director Conduct 
 Having suggested that application of the business judgment rule 
standard to corporate officers and controlling shareholders is unnecessary 
and unsound on doctrinal and policy grounds,125 could the same be said 
with respect to application of the rule to directors themselves?  The 
emergent areas of officers and controlling shareholders at least offer a 
lens to reconsider this issue.  Such a suggestion, initially, seems 
heretical, particularly given the rule's long pedigree as the presumptive 
standard of judicial review.126  And the policy rationales for the rule are 
sound,127 particularly the court's deference to the substance of director 
decisions.128  Nonetheless, the role of the business judgment rule in 
                                                                                                             
(2002). 
121In re Cox Commc'ns S'holder Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
122Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
123879 A.2d at 643-44; 2013 WL 2436341 at *5. 
124Id. at 644 (if only one approval mechanism were used, the entire fairness standard 
would remain applicable). 
125For officers, the doctrinal and policy rationales for applying the business judgment 
rule are stronger than for controlling shareholders given officers' managerial role in corporate 
governance, but use of the rule is unnecessary.  For controlling shareholders, use of the rule is 
unsound on doctrinal/policy grounds and the rule unnecessarily complicates what should be a 
more straightforward fiduciary duty analysis. 
126Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993); 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
127See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
128QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 45 n.17. 
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Delaware corporate law warrants revisiting for several reasons. 
 First, the business judgment rule, not fiduciary duties, currently 
enjoys pride of place in Delaware.129  Essentially, the business judgment 
rule is a doctrinal vessel of judicial review into which the fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty are fitted and subsumed.130  As noted by the Delaware 
Supreme Court, the duty of care is but an "element of the rule."131  But 
fiduciary duties are broader in scope than the reach of the business 
judgment rule, which applies only if an identifiable business judgment is 
made.132  An example is a faulty oversight context where no business 
decision was exercised.133  And fiduciary duties apply to directors 
whether or not their conduct is reviewed later in court.134  Thus, the more 
narrowly applicable doctrine should not sensibly serve as the umbrella 
concept for the broader-reaching duties.  Moreover, given the importance 
of judicial formulations to lawyerly counsel and director 
understandings,135 it is no answer to insist that the rule is a standard of 
review only and not a standard of conduct.  Presumably, many non-law 
factors influence legal advice and director conduct, but when it comes to 
law itself, the sole concern is likely whether, if attacked, a decision 
stands up in court and liability is averted.  The deployment of the 
business judgment rule as the organizing framework, therefore, is 
jurisprudentially flawed because it is under-inclusive.  Its retention as the 
keystone concept reflects a misguided effort to use it as a unifying 
doctrinal artifact for both conceiving and reviewing director compliance 
with fiduciary duties. 
 Second, the primacy of the business judgment rule over fiduciary 
duties in Delaware's analysis of director performance is an accident of 
history.136  The duty of care, being a doctrinal latecomer,137 was, along 
 
                                                                                                             
129See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(noting that under the business judgment rule, the court presumes "directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in 
the best interests of the company"). 
130See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text. 
131Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 (Del. 1994).  See supra notes 
38-39 and accompanying text. 
132Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).  The Delaware Supreme Court, 
moreover, has described director duties as "unremitting."  Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10-
11(Del. 1998). 
133Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 & n.9 (Del. 1993). 
134See Malone, 722 A.2d at 10 (noting that fiduciary duties are a "constant compass by 
which all director actions . . . must be guided"). 
135See id. (noting the court has tried to mark clear guidelines regarding fiduciary duties 
to help directors act within them); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (stating the business judgment 
rule is "both a procedural guide for litigants and a substantive rule of law"). 
136See supra Part II.A. 
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with the duty of loyalty, embedded into the pre-existing business 
judgment rule framework in Cede, in an effort to harmonize those duties 
with the rule.138  But the rule has retained analytical preeminence, leading 
to a diminished emphasis on what is really most critical to corporate 
governance, both in and out of court:  Did directors fulfill or breach 
either of their fiduciary duties?139  That issue should be doctrinally 
showcased, not obscured. 
 Third, all of the laudable policy rationales said to undergird the 
rule can be preserved while placing primary emphasis on a director's 
fiduciary duties.  The plaintiff still must establish a breach of any 
fiduciary duty.140  And in the duty of care context, the court still would 
not weigh in on the substantive soundness of director decisions.141  But 
that already is true in the duty of care context because care itself is 
entirely process-oriented.142  There is no substance to duty of care 
review.143  Consequently, there is no need to add, via the rule, either 
Aronson's "presumption" strand of the rule or the Sinclair/Cede 
"substantive" strand.144  Thus, it is as an aspect of duty of care review that 
the true "substantive" function of the business judgment rule can be seen.  
It cogently houses the sensible policy decision of courts not to second-
guess business judgments as part of reviewing fiduciary duty of care 
claims.145  Ironically, then, business judgment deference is better 
understood as an "element" of care, not the reverse, as currently is the 
case.146  In effect, the judicial policy of not substantively reviewing care 
claims mirrors the opposite entire fairness approach in loyalty claims 
where substance is reviewed.147  In classic director self-dealing (loyalty) 
                                                                                                             
137See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text. 
138See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
139Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (describing the duties of loyalty and care as standards 
within the business judgment rule). 
140Id. at 361. 
141Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("As for the plaintiffs' contention 
that the directors failed to exercise 'substantive due care,' we should note that such a concept is 
foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors' 
judgments."). 
142Id.  ("Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care only."). 
143Id. 
144See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.  To the extent a substantive "floor" 
for fiduciary behavior is thought desirable, substantively irrational behavior permits an 
inference that good faith is lacking.  Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 
1999). 
145See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 (highlighting the policy of the courts not to 
second-guess business judgments). 
146See id. at 360 (describing the duties of loyalty and care as standards within the 
business judgment rule). 
147See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that in the context of 
business judgments due care is not reviewed substantively); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361 
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cases, of course, the judicial policy of no substantive review falls away 
and the rule does not and should not play any role.148 
 Moreover, the only theoretical basis for imposing liability on a 
director or for overturning a board decision is violation of some legal 
precept, such as a fiduciary duty.149  It is not unlawful to make a business 
judgment; it is unlawful to do so in a way that breaches a duty.150  Thus, 
the focus should be on fiduciary duties, which courts are legally 
competent to address, not the "business judgment" rule.  The mere 
phrasing of it suggests that there is some jurisprudential basis for 
judicially interfering (or not) in a business decision when there is no such 
basis apart from a duty breach.151  Even then, courts do not "review" or 
"second-guess" the substance of business decisions; they simply proceed 
with the analysis under fiduciary duty principles.152 
 Directors are afforded ample latitude in making business 
decisions and taking appropriate risks by calibrating the duty of care at 
the gross negligence level,153 essentially a permissive recklessness 
standard.154  Thus, even as to process, great deference is given to 
directors.  Moreover, statutory exculpation remains fully available for 
duty of care breaches if stockholders approve an even greater measure of 
protection for directors than just a loose liability standard.155  Neither of 
these benefits requires the business judgment rule.  In addition, the 
current pleading or review standards on a motion to dismiss need not 
change.  A pleading that is inadequate to make it past a dismissal motion 
today under the rule's rubric will still be inadequate when the 
straightforward focus is on duties.156  If a plaintiff today cannot 
sufficiently plead enough to overcome the "presumption" of Aronson and 
Cede, he has not adequately pled a breach of duty.157  And, as Professor 
                                                                                                             
(describing the entire fairness standard of review). 
148See supra Part II.C.1, C.3. 
149See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61 (explaining that plaintiffs have the burden of 
showing a breach of a fiduciary duty). 
150Id. 
151See id. at 361 (noting that the court will not second guess a business judgment 
absent a showing by the plaintiff of a breach of director's fiduciary duties). 
152See id. (describing the entire fairness standard used for analysis of the disputed 
transaction). 
153Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
154McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1273-74 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
155DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012) (permitting exculpation of directors for 
damages resulting from duty of care breaches). 
156See, e.g., McPadden, 964 A.2d at 1274-75 (granting a motion to dismiss where 
plaintiff failed to plead directors acted with "a conscious disregard for their duties"). 
157See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (to 
overcome the presumption of validity of the business judgment rule, plaintiff must show a 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
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Larry Hamermesh has usefully pointed out, even with care claims, many 
are derivative in nature, and thereby are subject to existing Rule 23.1 
pleading requirements.158 
 Fourth, elevating fiduciary duties to be the primary focal point in 
judicially analyzing director conduct—and officer and shareholder 
conduct—streamlines that analysis and rationally aligns it with other 
fiduciary approaches in law, such as those used in agency law.159  For 
example, in a 2010 decision involving agency principles, Vice 
Chancellor Parsons noted how a claim for fiduciary duty wrongdoing 
requires proof of two elements: "that a fiduciary duty existed" and "that a 
defendant breached that duty."160  That simple framework likewise could 
be used for directors.  Of course, directors owe unremitting duties,161 so 
the focus in any particular case is, quite simply, whether they did or did 
not breach a duty.  In the care setting, the plaintiff must bear that 
burden;162 while in the classic self-dealing loyalty context, one or more 
directors will shoulder the burden.163  
 Fifth, prioritizing the business judgment rule rather than 
fiduciary duties in judicial analysis serves to unsoundly deem directors to 
be performing at a higher level than they might actually be performing, 
while simultaneously insufficiently emphasizing the affirmative nature of 
their duties.164  The business judgment rule, after all, presumes that 
directors have acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the 
honest belief that their actions are in the best interests of the company.165  
In other words, it presupposes that directors are behaving carefully and 
loyally, without expressly stating it just that way.166  Yet, by agreeing to 
serve as directors, such persons take on an affirmative obligation they did 
not have before assuming their position—i.e., to act with care and loyalty 
in discharging their offices.167  Care and loyalty are not exercised, and the 
 
                                                                                                             
158See Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1. 
159See, e.g., Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, ASDI, Inc., 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 
2010) ("Under fundamental principles of agency law, an agent owes his principal a duty of 
loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing."). 
160Id. (citing Zrii, LLC v. Wellness Acq. Gp., Inc., 2009 WL 2998169, at *11 (Del Ch. 
Sept. 21, 2009)).  
161Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). 
162Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
163See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 707 (Del. 2009) (noting that where a 
majority of the remaining directors are self-interested, they must prove entire fairness). 
164See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 787, 805 (1999) (expressing concern that duty of care analysis is substantially 
shrinking partially due to the business judgment rule). 
165Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360-61. 
166Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360. 
167Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, § 7 cmt. k (2010) (stating that one who 
 
428 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
best interests of the company are not served, merely by the fact of 
occupying the office of director or by inaction.168  In both judicial 
doctrine and legal counsel given to directors, therefore, it should be 
emphasized that directors, as the key governing body in a corporation, 
must affirmatively fulfill their duties, not essentially get a linguistic 
benefit of the doubt that they are doing all they should unless proven 
otherwise.169 
 This obligation is masked by an approach that presumes 
directors have behaved properly, rather than one underscoring that 
directors must energetically endeavor to do so.170  This has nothing to do 
with altering the customary burden of proof in litigation.171  It goes 
instead to not unwittingly crafting a review standard that, in operation, 
misleadingly suggests that directors have fulfilled their duties unless a 
plaintiff can prove otherwise.172  The tree does fall in the forest whether 
or not someone is there to observe it.  So too, inadequate director 
conduct is inadequate, even if undetected or unproven.   
 And in featuring fiduciary duties more prominently in their 
opinions, judges should not couch those duties only in negative, liability-
avoiding ways.173  Thus, with respect to care, courts can and certainly 
should state that the culpability standard is gross negligence.174  But the 
duty of care is not merely a duty to avoid gross negligence,175 because 
such phrasing lacks a reference point:  Don't be grossly negligent with 
respect to what?  Rather, as Chancellor Chandler noted in the Disney 
litigation,176 the "duty of due care requires that directors of a Delaware 
corporation 'use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent 
men would use in similar circumstances.'"177  And in loyalty cases, courts 
                                                                                                             
affirmatively acts in a manner creating risk of harm to others must exercise reasonable care in 
performing those acts). 
168See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 823 (N.J. 1981) ("A director 
is not an ornament, but an essential component of corporate governance."). 
169Id. 
170See Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999). 
171But see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("[T]he burden is on the 
party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption."). 
172Id.  
173See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("[F]ulfillment of 
the fiduciary function requires more than the mere absence of bad faith or fraud."). 
174Id. at 873 ("We think the concept of gross negligence is also the proper standard for 
determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of directors was an informed 
one.").  
175Id. at 872-73.  The Revised Uniform Partnership Act also provides that the duty of 
care for a general partner is that of gross negligence.  REV. UNIF. PART. ACT § 404 (1997). 
176In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
177Id. at 749 (quoting Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 
1963)). 
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likewise should not only emphasize the importance of not being 
disloyal—as, for example, by not wrongly self-dealing or appropriating 
corporate opportunities.178  Here again, the affirmative aspect of loyally 
advancing the best interests of the company should be routinely recited.179  
Doing so would both draw on the traditional moral discourse aspect of 
fiduciary duties recently emphasized by Chief Justice Steele,180 and 
promote emerging evidence from behavioral psychology that ex ante 
moral admonition can lead to more honest conduct.181 
 When a plaintiff asserts a claim, moreover, the focus should be 
forthrightly on whether a cognizable breach of duty claim has been 
pled,182 unfiltered by unnecessary reference to (or through) the threshold 
"presumption" of the business judgment rule, which is not even a 
particularly useful heuristic.183  A legal Occam's Razor should excise the 
rule at this stage of fiduciary analysis,184 and functionally draw on it only 
to preclude substantive second-guessing as part of the due care review.185 
 Finally, elevating fiduciary duties in prominence, and reducing a 
 
                                                                                                             
178See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 263 (Del. 2002) (providing an 
example of self-dealing by directors of a corporation); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939) (providing an example of directors usurping a corporate opportunity). 
179See generally Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in 
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003) (emphasizing affirmative aspect of loyalty); 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti, & Jeffrey M. Gorris, 
Loyalty's Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 
629 (2010) (concluding that the basic definition of the duty of loyalty is the obligation to act in 
good faith to advance the best interests of the corporation). 
180Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware's Modern Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 3, 3 (2012) (explaining that one 
of the two purposes of fiduciary duties is to serve as a "moral pulse of our society as we define 
and set expectations for business relationships").  See also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative 
In Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 
850-51 (2009) (elaborating on the strong moral reproof role of Delaware's opinions). 
181Dan Ariely, Why We Lie, THE WALL STREET J., May 26, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304840904577422090013997320.html. 
182Cf. Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("A claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of two elements: (1) that a fiduciary duty existed and 
(2) that the defendant breached that duty."). 
183See Carol Seidler, Assessing the Wisdom of the Business Judgment Rule in 
Corporate Control Contests: Is It Time to Make Shareholders' Interests Paramount, 23 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 919, 923 (1990) ("Regardless of what standard applies, courts struggle in 
imposing [liability] consistently due to the broad and often anomalous protection afforded by 
the business judgment rule."). 
184Occam's Razor (or, the law of parsimony) is a principle whereby a simpler theory 
with equivalent explanatory power is preferred over a more complex approach, in effect 
"shaving away" what is unneeded. Ockham's razor, Britannica.com, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/424706/Ockhams-razor (last visited May 21, 
2004).  
185See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
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threshold emphasis on the business judgment rule as a standard of 
review, would facilitate teaching law students and others the rudiments 
of fiduciary duties.  In a wry bit of understatement, the American Law 
Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance state as follows:  
"Confusion with respect to the business judgment rule has been created 
by the numerous varying formulations of the rule and the fact that courts 
have often stated the rule incompletely or with elliptical shorthand 
references."186  In an effort to alleviate confusion, the ALI, unlike 
Delaware which embeds the duty of care within the business judgment 
rule edifice,187 regards the rule as simply "a judicial gloss on duty of care 
standards . . . ."188  Yet, confusion persists, and not just in the ranks of the 
elite corporate bar.189 
 After all, the patrons of Delaware law are not only the 
sophisticated members of the Delaware judiciary and Delaware bar.  
They include numerous business lawyers across the country (and maybe 
in other countries, such as Canada and England) who devote less than an 
exclusive professional focus on Delaware developments.190  Importantly, 
they also include thousands of law students every year who must learn 
law and who someday may counsel the governing officials of Delaware 
companies.  Is Delaware fiduciary duty law and judicial analysis as clear 
and user-friendly as it might be to these less knowledgeable patrons?  
And to the extent Delaware law influences corporate law in other 
jurisdictions, such as other states and countries, perhaps Delaware 
exports needless complexity to lawyers and students in those places.191  
As just one law professor who has grappled with teaching this 
material to law students for almost thirty years, this author can say that 
presenting students with a comprehensible, coherent, and cogent 
understanding of fiduciary duties is made more difficult by Delaware's 
current business judgment rule construct.  Students—having studied the 
concept of legal duty in diverse curricular offerings such as torts, trusts 
and estates, agency and partnership law, and professional 
 
                                                                                                             
186A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOV: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. 
a, at 173 (1994). 
187Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993), modified 636 A.2d 
956 (Del. 1994). 
188A.L.I. PRINCIPLES, supra note 186, at cmt d., at 141. 
189See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, supra note 33, at 94 ("Subsuming the presumptions and 
limitations under the term 'business judgment rule' leads to confusion because the single term 
is then employed with reference to wholly different aspects of the rule's application, which are 
governed by disparate legal principles."). 
190Del. St. Bar Ass'n, Membership, DSBA.ORG, http://www.dsba.org/index.php/about-
the-dsba/membership.html (last visited on Jan. 27, 2013). 
191See Arsht, supra note 33, at 93-94. 
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responsibility—understand the importance of legal duties, including the 
scope of duty and situations of no-duty.192  The concepts of care and 
loyalty, in all their manifestations, are therefore relatively easy to grasp, 
if of somewhat surprising contours.  And the longstanding policy of 
judicial non-review that forms the key substantive essence of the 
business judgment rule193—really, as noted, an aspect of duty of care 
review—even if initially startling for many students who see legal 
liability expanding elsewhere as judges scrutinize so many aspects of 
modern life, can at least be appreciated and grasped, if not also 
immediately agreed with.194 
 Analytically and doctrinally, the teaching could stop there—with 
fiduciary duties and their breach—and students would have a solid and 
workable understanding.195  Little but unnecessary complexity in the law 
and pedagogy is added by then filtering all of the above through the 
threshold of the business judgment rule construct as a standard of review, 
particularly with the Cede breach of duty/burden shift feature.196  
Introducing this form of the business judgment rule after addressing 
fiduciary duties can lead students to think they may not truly grasp duties 
after all, whereas starting with the Delaware business judgment rule 
construct—before taking up duties—can hinder students from ever 
clearly seeing just how vital duties really are.197  The overall result today 
may be student familiarity with core concepts, but likely not a true 
understanding.  This, unfortunately, likely is the case with many 
practicing lawyers as well.  
 
                                                                                                             
192See, e.g., Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, Delaware Student Curriculum, 
LAW.WIDENER.EDU,  http://law.widener.edu/Gateway/CurrentStudents/DelawareStudents/ 
AcademicResources/Curriculum.aspx (last visited on Jan. 27, 2013). 
193Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 631 
(2000) (stating that the business judgment rule reflects a policy of judicial non-review of the 
substance of business decisions); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as 
Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 90 (2004). 
 194See Arsht, supra note 33, at 94 (stating that the confusion surrounding the business 
judgment rule has been compounded by "[j]udicial penchant for colorful phrases" like "gross 
negligence," "gross abuse of discretion," and "palpable overreaching").   
 195See Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment 
Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2009) ("The duty of loyalty defines what 
the directors are to seek to accomplish . . . . The duty of care defines how they are to pursue 
that goal . . . . Good faith . . . describes the state of mind of a director who is acting in 
accordance with her duty of loyalty."). 
196Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
197See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and 
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 972 (1989) (concluding that "[t]he duty of care is not without 
its problems.  Nevertheless, it has served as a critical component of the corporate system in 
this country."). 
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III.   DOES (OR SHOULD) CORPORATE LAW MANDATE CORPORATE 
PURPOSE? 
A.  Background 
 If there is a surfeit of law on the business judgment rule,198 there 
is a paucity on corporate purpose.199  No corporate statute in the United 
States, for example, requires a corporation to advance a particular 
purpose, such as profit or share price maximization.200  Rather, consistent 
with an expansive, enabling philosophy on company powers and 
purposes, corporate statutes—including Delaware's—are wholly agnostic 
on corporate purpose.201  Delaware's corporate purpose statute broadly 
states that a corporation may conduct "any lawful business or 
purpose[]."202 
 As to case law, there are only a handful of decisions in the entire 
country that address purpose, and some of those do so quite obliquely in 
dicta.203  The Delaware Supreme Court has held only that corporate 
 
                                                                                                             
198See supra Part II. 
199See William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are 
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 n.33 
(2012) (collecting the few cases). 
200See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) ("Corporate managers have never had an enforceable legal duty to 
maximize corporate profits.").  See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 
24-32 (2012) ("The notion that corporate law requires directors, executives, and employees to 
maximize shareholder wealth simply isn't true.").  
201See EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION 
LAW § 102.4 (5th ed. 2012) ("In lieu of the formerly required recitals of the corporation's 
business or purposes, the statute now requires only the statement that the corporation may 
engage in any lawful act or activity.").  See also DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE 
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.01[3] (2012) (explaining that the Delaware corporate 
purpose statute has become widely used as the "exclusive statement of purpose"). 
202Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2011) ("A corporation may be 
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote any lawful business or 
purposes . . . ."),  and § 102(a)(3) ("It shall be sufficient to state . . . that the purpose of the 
corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity."), with JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 240-48 (3d ed. 2010) (comparing 
Delaware's broad corporate purpose statutes with other state statutes that allow or require a 
corporate purpose that takes into account parties involved other than shareholders). 
203The iconic case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
(stating in dictum and without recitation of authority that a business's primary purpose is to 
maximize shareholder wealth).  Dodge is a peculiar case for many reasons, not the least of 
which is that minority shareholders earned over 20 times their initial investment from special 
dividends alone.  See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and 
Benefit Corps, 25 REGENT L. REV. 269, 274 n.22 (2012).  See generally, David Yosifon, The 
Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2013).  This Author and 
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directors do not typically have an obligation to maximize the share price 
in the short term,204 even as they act to "benefit" stockholders205—or to 
accede to shareholder desires on that score206—and they only have such 
an obligation only in one narrow setting:207 a corporation's "end stage," 
i.e., in a corporate break-up, when they initiate an active bidding process, 
or when they enter into a transaction that shifts a dispersed shareholding 
base into a controller's hands, essentially a privatization.208  In each of 
these settings, the aim is for most of the shareholders to exit because the 
venture, for them, will be over.209  Beyond that, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has mandated nothing, or even spoken.210 
 The Delaware Court of Chancery likewise said little until 
2010,211 in a decision to which this Article will return.212  In dictum, in a 
1986 case brought by creditors,213 the Delaware Court of Chancery said 
that corporations should advance the long-term interests of 
stockholders.214  And, correspondingly and in line with the Delaware 
Supreme Court decision in Time,215 in 2011, that Court observed that 
directors have no obligation to maximize the short-term share price.216 
                                                                                                             
Professor Yosifon disagree on what Delaware law requires as to corporate purpose but 
Professor Yosifon's article provides a full treatment.  See also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our 
Continuing Struggle With The Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 135, 147 n.34, 147-48 n.35 (2012) (collecting commentary).  For other 
judicial decisions discussing corporate purpose see Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 
(Del. Ch. 1986) ("It is the obligation of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the 
long-run interests of the corporation's stockholders.").  But see Long v. Northwood Hills Corp., 
380 S.W.2d 451, 476-77 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (examining a corporation's purpose that is not to 
maximize shareholder wealth). 
204See Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
205In Gheewalla, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that directors act to "benefit" 
stockholders but the Court did not mandate maximization.  N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming 
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (citing Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. 
NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004)).  
206See Paramount Commc'n, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150. 
207See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986) (discussing best price).  See also Paramount Comnc'n, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1994) (discussing the best value).  
208See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994) 
(stating when this obligation is triggered).  See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (discussing 
maximization).  
209See Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994).  
210See COX & HAZEN, supra note 202, at 240-48 (comparing Delaware's vague use of 
the corporate purpose statute with other states that suggest or require a more narrow corporate 
purpose). 
211See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33-34 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
212See infra Part III.B (discussing the decision in eBay). 
213Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 875 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
214Id. at 879. 
215See Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
216See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 112 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
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 If there is so little law, one might ask where beliefs on this 
foundational issue originate.217  Pretty clearly, thinking stems from 
perceptions (even if faulty) about legal mandates,218 business norms and 
conventions, management lore, faulty executive compensation 
incentives, and through the professional training provided in business 
and law schools.219  These are powerful influencers of thought and 
conduct. 
 Underlying these formative molders of belief and action lie 
theories about both individuals and institutions.220  As to individuals, a 
strong political-legal emphasis on liberty, coupled with neo-classical 
economic analysis,221 leads to a depiction of people as essentially self-
interested.222  Consequently, in commercial settings, whether in or outside 
a firm, individuals, behaviorally, are presumed to consistently navigate 
and bargain for self-advantage.223  Recently, this impoverished 
anthropological view of human behavior has been challenged by 
behavioralists based on empirical work,224 largely because instances of 
altruistic behavior and self-denial are simply too common to ignore.225 
 At the organizational level of theory—whether as to a 
corporation or other association—this cramped anthropology of the 
individual carries over.226  The organization is frequently theorized as a 
"nexus of contracts,"227 that is, as simply a web of various contracting 
relationships.228  It is essentially disaggregated and disregarded as a 
meaningful institution in its own right.229  Little heed is given to whether 
the organization itself—be it a business firm, university, sports team, 
                                                                                                             
(quoting Paramount Commc'n, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150). 
217See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism In Corporate Form: Corporate Law And Benefit 
Corporations, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 273-76 (2013). 
218This certainly lies behind the post eBay enactment of legislation in several states 
permitting the formation of so-called "benefit corporations," that need not maximize profits or 
returns to shareholders.  See id.  
219Id. at 275-76. 
220See Henry Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 99, 103-06 (1989).  See also William W. Bratton Jr., The New Economic Theory of the 
Firm:  Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1480-82 (1989). 
221Bratton, supra note 220, at 1480. 
222See Butler, supra note 220, at 103-06.  See also Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the 
Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 75, 84-89 (describing self-interest premise in 
corporate law and contrary evidence). 
223The seminal work is FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 23-29 (1991).  
224See STOUT, supra note 200, at 96-102.  See also Johnson, supra note 217, at 273-76. 
225See STOUT, supra note 200, at 96-102.   
226See id. at 97-102 
227See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223, at 12. 
228See id. 
229See Bratton, supra note 220, at 1475. 
2013] UNSETTLEDNESS IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW 435 
labor union, religious organization, school, social club or other group—
might have an overarching institutional purpose or "mission" distinct 
from that of its various constituencies.230  Many such contractarian 
theorists, moreover, are strictly shareholder focused,231 especially those 
emphasizing an agency theory approach,232 and thus "corporate" purpose 
for them means maximizing shareholder wealth.233  Multi-stakeholder 
conceptions of a corporation, including the Team Production theory,234 
broaden corporate purpose to encompass non-shareholder 
constituencies.235  But neither shareholder primacy nor stakeholder 
theorists fully account for various noncontractual interests.236  And 
neither model articulates a truly "corporate" institutional objective or 
purpose.237  Moreover, these alternative theoretical ways of thinking 
about corporate purpose are largely unaffected by the fact that such 
collectivities are legal persons utterly distinct from their diverse 
constituencies.238 
 Beyond positive law and theory addressing corporate purpose, 
the normative debate has gone on for decades and shows no signs of 
abating.239  The shareholder primacy camp advocates that profit 
 
                                                                                                             
230This is a critical failing of both shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory 
approaches to corporate purpose.  See Lyman Johnson et al., Teaching The Purpose of 
Business in Catholic Business Education, J. CATH. HIGHER ED. 18-24 (2012) (criticizing these 
two approaches and advocating that a better individual and institutional understanding of a 
corporation is gained through a "Community of Persons" Model).  Professor Andrew Keay 
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developing in various articles. See ANDREW KEAY, THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE ch. 4 (2011) 
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231See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223.  
232See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-13 (1976).  
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of opinion as to corporate purpose.  See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder 
Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2001).  
233See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 8. 
234See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249-50 (1999). 
235See id. 
236See KEAY, supra note 230, at 191-97 (explaining the problems with the 
contractarian theory). 
237This critique is made quite penetratingly by Professor Keay.  See id. at 189-97. 
238However corporations are conceived as a matter of theory, and however contentious 
(and unresolved) the shareholder-stakeholder debate about corporate purpose may be, it is not 
controversial that, as a positive law matter, corporations are distinct legal persons, separate 
from their various constituencies.  See Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History 
of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1140 
(2012).  
239This is well captured in a number of places but KEAY, supra note 230, at 173 
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maximization and shareholder wealth should be the proper and sole 
corporate purpose.240  This largely builds on Adolph Berle's original 
"trust" conception of managers as "trustees" for shareholder interests, in 
an effort to avoid according managers uncontrollable discretion.241  
Today, this is frequently couched in principal-agent terminology,242 in 
which, contrary to law,243 financial theorists simplistically regard 
directors and managers as "agents" of their "principals," the 
shareholders.244  This descriptive error in modeling corporate 
relationships haunts "corporate" theory today.  It represents, moreover, a 
profound failure by corporate law scholars, in the 1980s and now, who 
draw on finance theory, to insist on accurately portraying the legal 
dimension of institutional relationships.  Even theorists who emphasize 
the reality of board governance make the normative turn toward investor 
interests.  Thus, shareholder well-being is the normative goal in 
Professor Bainbridge's well-known "director primacy" model.245 
 Those advancing multiple purposes or a broader corporate focus 
than simply maximizing financial returns for investors, frequently stand 
on a "multi-stakeholder" or "communitarian" conception of corporate 
purpose.246  More neutrally, they may advance a pluralistic, 
institutionalist approach in which different firms and their managers 
pursue different purposes, in varying degrees combining financial 
pursuits with "socially responsible" objectives.247  The antecedents for 
stakeholder views are Merrick Dodd's multi-constituency conception of 
director duties,248 and Berle's more societal model of the corporation249—
each extending consideration to noncontracting parties such as the 
"public interest"—as well as mid-20th century managerialism.250  These 
                                                                                                             
provides a full, recent summary. 
240Id. at 43-44. 
241A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). 
242See STOUT, supra note 200, at 18; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 309. 
243See STOUT, supra note 200, at 27-32 (explaining that shareholder maximization is 
not required by law).  Directors are not, legally, agents of shareholders or of the company 
itself.  Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp., Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 539-40 (Del. 1996). 
244See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 309-10. 
245Stephen Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. 
REV. 1 (2002). 
246KEAY, supra note 230, at 117-18. 
247See Johnson, supra note 217, at 290-91 (advocating a more pluralistic, less monistic 
approach to corporate purpose but not a stakeholder approach). 
248E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. 
REV.  1145, 1147-48 (1932). 
249ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 312-13 (1932).  
250See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 37 (1954) 
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normative stakeholder/communitarian positions, while certainly 
expanding the number of interests that should be considered and/or 
served by a corporation's governing officials, continually fail to articulate 
a truly overarching "corporate" purpose or mission.251 
 As to which normative position has held sway, historically, they 
tend to ebb and flow in influence.252  Growing out of the famous Berle-
Dodd debate of the early 1930s,253 the managerialist view predominated 
in mid-century as shareholder primacy receded.254 Notwithstanding iconic 
assertions by economist Milton Friedman in the early 1960s and again in 
1970,255 many prominent mid-century thinkers did not concur with his 
profit maximization position.256  The Friedman view received an 
intellectual shot in the arm from financial theorists in the 1970s, 
however, with the emergence of theoretical work on the firm by financial 
theorists.257  And that "nexus of contracts" theory was very quickly 
imported into legal scholarship via the "law and economics" movement 
in the 1980s.258  Its normative shareholder primacy position, moreover, 
rapidly became predominant as well in corporate law theory.259  Today, it 
permeates the teaching of corporation law at elite law schools (and 
business schools).260  Yet, through all this, even during the tumultuous 
1980s takeover era,261 Delaware law remained largely agnostic and 
                                                                                                             
(explaining that the purpose of business must lie outside itself in society because business is an 
"organ of society"). 
251KEAY, supra note 230, at 171; Johnson, supra note 217, at 290-91. 
252KEAY, supra note 230, at 21. 
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"theory, not practice"); Dodd, supra note 248, at 1147-48. 
254DRUCKER, supra note 250, at 36.  Berle conceded mid-century that Dodd's view, at 
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255MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); Milton Friedman, The 
Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 
33. 
256Besides management guru Peter Drucker's mid-century views, see supra note 250, 
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maximization.  Robert Anthony, The Trouble with Profit Maximization, 38 HARV. BUS. REV. 
126  (1960). 
257See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 232, at 329-30. 
258EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 223, at 12, 90-91. 
259D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 (1998). 
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primacy approach to corporate purpose.  Darrell West, The Purpose of the Corporation in 
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http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/7/19%20corporation%20west/0
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261Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and 
Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 933 (1990) (noting that Delaware courts remained 
 
438 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW [Vol. 38 
ambivalent about corporate purpose.262 
 As we currently stand in the midst of a seemingly strict 
shareholder primacy theoretical era, it should be recalled that normative 
positions on corporate purpose have dramatically changed, historically.  
Besides changes in 20th century thinking noted above, in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries, for example, corporations generally were 
chartered to fulfill some public purpose, not solely to pursue private 
gain.263  Although law moved away from requiring a public purpose to 
permitting private gain, it never—outside very narrow settings264—has 
required the pursuit of a particular purpose.  Thus, law today, by being 
agnostic, rightly refrains in a free society from prematurely (if ever) 
foreclosing ongoing, and sometimes shifting, social and normative 
debates about the proper goal(s) of corporate activity.265  This stance 
seems particularly sensible at those moments when significant segments 
of American society once again appear to be somewhat disenchanted 
with the corporate sector.  Likely, we are now in a period in which 
societal expectations of the private business sector are shifting.  As such, 
law rightly adopts an enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate 
purpose, even as the fiduciary obligations of directors and managers can 
clash with that permissiveness because of the need to hold such persons 
accountable for their conduct.  Often the deference of the business 
judgment rule becomes a key mechanism for creating the necessary slack 
between law's agnosticism about corporate purpose and actual 
governance conduct. 
 It is against this doctrinal, theoretical, and historical backdrop 
that the 2010 Delaware Court of Chancery case of eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark arises.266  For the first time, albeit in an 
unusual procedural setting, a Delaware court, outside the so-called 
Revlon setting,267 articulated shareholder wealth maximization as the 
required objective of corporate endeavor.268  Such a novel and bold 
position invites close study. 
                                                                                                             
"ambivalent" about corporate purpose to reflect larger societal ambivalence). 
262Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 1385, 1415, 1425 (2008).  The judiciary's ambivalence about corporate purpose remains 
in the twenty-first century.  Id. at 1426.  
263Johnson, supra note 238, at 1144-47. 
264See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 
265See supra notes 261-62 (noting societal ambivalence about corporate purpose).  
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B.  The eBay Decision 
1.  Craigslist and Its Investors 
 Craigslist, Inc. was formed in the 1990s as a California 
corporation that,269 in 2004, was reincorporated in Delaware.270  It had 
three early shareholders—Messrs. Craig, Buckmaster, and Knowlton—
and thirty-four employees.271  Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that 
Craigslist had an unusual business strategy, culture, and perspective on 
what it means to run a successful business.272  This is because it mainly 
operates its business as a community service.273  Nearly all classified ads 
are placed without charge, and Craigslist does not sell advertising 
space.274  Its only revenue is derived from fees for job postings in selected 
cities and from apartment listings in New York City.275  Mr. Craig 
described this as the corporate "mission," and Chandler observed that the 
management team was "committed to this community service approach 
to doing business."276  Thus, management's good faith is evident, as is 
Craig's recognition that money is needed to advance the corporate 
mission.  This philosophical approach to business, it should be noted, is 
similar to Mark Zuckerberg's 2012 description of Facebook's strategy, as 
described by that iconic company's founder in a letter to shareholders 
accompanying the filing of a registration statement with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission.277  There, Mr. Zuckerberg stated that 
Facebook did not "build services to make money; we make money to 
build better services."278 
 The Craigslist strategy has been very successful.  Craigslist long 
has been the dominant company in the online classified ads industry.279  
In 2002, however, one shareholder—Knowlton—wanted a greater 
emphasis on profits and thus he started shopping his shares in an effort to 
goad his two co-investors to effectuate change.280  eBay sought 
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Knowlton's shares, tentatively agreeing to pay $15 million.281  eBay's 
initial hope was to acquire all of the Craigslist stock, not remain a 
minority investor.282  Craig and Buckmaster made it quite clear, however, 
that they would not sell to eBay.283  As part of the negotiations to 
purchase Knowlton's stock, eBay negotiated with Craig and Buckmaster 
as well over a variety of corporate governance issues.284  The result was 
that Knowlton received $16 million from eBay for his stock and, in 
essence, eBay invested another $16 million in Craigslist followed by 
Craigslist paying Craig and Buckmaster $8 million each as a dividend.285  
In this way, importantly, all three investors gained significant financial 
benefit from their positions as shareholders and as a result of the 
Knowlton transaction, eBay owned 28.4% of Craigslist stock, and Craig 
and Buckmaster continued to own 42.6% and 29%, respectively.286 
 These three shareholders entered a Shareholders' Agreement that, 
among other provisions, gave eBay the right to consent to certain 
transactions and restricted the transfer of shares by all three investors.287  
eBay expressly preserved a right to compete with Craigslist in the 
classified ads business.288  Upon doing so, however, it would lose its 
consent rights but, correspondingly, its shares became freely 
transferable.289  Although eBay's long-term plan was to acquire Craigslist 
outright, it went into its position as a minority shareholder in a business 
having a unique strategy with its corporate eyes open.290  eBay was under 
no illusion as to what Craigslist's avowed "mission" and business 
strategy was.291  Moreover, it negotiated certain provisions but not 
others.292  Notably, recalling here the teachings of Nixon v. Blackwell on 
the ability of investors in close corporations to bargain ex ante for certain 
financial benefits such as mandatory dividends, "put" or "call" options, 
and so on,293 eBay did not so bargain on the core subjects of corporate 
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purpose, profit-making, and purchase rights.294 
 Far from Craig and Buckmaster altering the Craigslist business 
philosophy, they sought from eBay even greater appreciation for 
Craigslist's "unique mission."295  The parties—now in a co-investor 
relationship—had sharply divergent views about whether and how to 
more vigorously "monetize" Craigslist.296  Relations became further 
strained when eBay launched its own competitive business in 2007.297  
This meant that eBay lost consent rights, but also that its stock became 
freely transferrable.298  Craig and Buckmaster sought legal counsel as to 
how to keep eBay from placing a director on the three-person board, 
given that Craigslist had cumulative voting, and also on how to limit 
eBay's ability to purchase additional Craigslist shares.299 
 Critical for this Article's purposes was the eventual adoption of a 
Rights Plan ("poison pill"), an oddity for a close corporation.  The aim of 
the Craigslist Plan was to prevent eBay from selling its shares as a block 
and from buying additional shares, particularly after Craig and 
Buckmaster died.300  In 2008, eBay sued Craigslist, Craig and 
Buckmaster, alleging that, by adopting the Rights Plan (and other 
measures not pertinent here), the latter gentlemen breached their 
fiduciary duties as both directors and controlling shareholders of 
Craigslist.301 
2.  The Court's Analysis 
 Characterizing the Rights Plan as a defensive measure, the 
Chancellor applied the Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard.302  This 
played a decisive role in the Chancellor's decision to nullify the Rights 
Plan because unlike Delaware law generally—which is agnostic on 
corporate purpose—Unocal, according to Chandler and a 2007 Delaware 
Court of Chancery decision he cited, requires that directors "'identify the 
proper corporate objectives served by their actions . . . .'"303  In fact, 
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Unocal requires directors to identify a threat to "corporate policy and 
effectiveness . . . ."304  This linguistic modification, and invocation of the 
phrase "proper corporate objective" (or "proper corporate purpose"), was 
central to Chandler's analysis because it seemingly presented for 
resolution the issue of what is a "proper" corporate purpose or 
objective.305  After invoking Unocal, Chandler immediately focused on 
"stockholder value" to define what he believed "corporate objective" 
meant.306  This is because Unocal arose in, and was designed for, hostile 
takeovers, where stockholders typically are, or conceivably might be, 
presented with an offer to purchase their stock.  That setting, however, 
was not pertinent in Craigslist because the company's Plan did not 
preclude any existent or imminent purchase offer to investors.307  But it 
influenced the analysis, as did the opinion's under-appreciation of 
Unocal's distinction between "corporate enterprise" and "stockholders."308  
It was a threat to the former that Unocal focused on, even if the threat 
came from an existing stockholder.309  By Chandler's own admission, 
eBay wanted to alter Craigslist's (very effective) corporate policy.310 
 The defendant directors understandably presented as the 
identified threat under Unocal, the possible alteration of Craigslist's core 
values, culture, business model, and public-service mission.311  Chandler 
pooh-poohed this as a trial tactic: a "fiction," designed to invoke the 
memorable reference to "corporate culture" in Paramount 
Communication, Inc. v. Time.312  But that characterization is passing 
strange given his own statement of facts where he clearly credits 
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*4 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990)). 
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Craigslist's "different" strategy, culture, and perspective on business.313 as 
well as his acknowledgment that the strategy "continues to be 
successful."314  Moreover, eBay obviously recognized the uniqueness of 
the Craigslist policy because it was precisely that business strategy that 
presented such a large potential monetization opportunity.315   
 Again switching from a focus on "corporate culture" to 
stockholders, Chandler stated that defendants had not shown that 
Craigslist "sufficiently promotes stockholder value . . . ."316  But 
Knowlton, an early shareholder, had recently departed with a cool $16 
million in an arm's length stock sale, and Craig and Buckmaster 
collectively received $16 million in dividends as part of that same 
transaction.317  Craigslist, thus, was not failing to provide significant 
financial returns to its investors.  The Chancellor then disparaged the 
public service mission as a "sales tactic" designed to build a vast 
community of users so that Craigslist could charge fees to select 
employers and real estate brokers seeking a "large market of      
consumers . . . ."318  Business strategy, however, is for corporate directors 
to craft, not judges.  Moreover, the complete reverse of what Chandler 
conjectured could equally be true.  Craigslist, like Facebook, might seek 
profits—clearly redounding to investor benefit—so that it can advance 
its larger, public-service corporate mission. 
 Having equated "corporate purpose" with "stockholder value," 
Chandler sought to add one further twist given that, factually, investors 
already had made significant sums from their holdings in Craigslist and 
thus its activities were not "purely philanthropic."319  He stated several 
times that a corporate policy is improper if it does not seek to 
"maximize" economic value for stockholders.320  Chandler acknowledged 
that Craig and Buckmaster had proven that they sincerely believed 
Craigslist's mission should not be about stockholder wealth 
maximization.321  Yet this determination of corporate objective by the 
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properly-constituted board of directors—who held, as stockholders, 72% 
of the stock—was considered by the Chancellor to be of no legal moment 
for Delaware law.322  It was not for them to decide, he effectively ruled, 
what purpose a corporation they founded and controlled should advance 
or even whether, as holders of 72% of the stock, they knew what was in 
their best interests.323  Rather, he said, it was up to him, and he could not 
accept such a strategy as valid.324  Seeking some legal foundation for his 
view, he could only come up with the fact that Craigslist was a "for-
profit" corporation.325  But he did not go on to explain how being a "for-
profit" corporation meant a company had to "maximize" profits, as 
opposed to making (or seeking or enhancing) profits326—as Craigslist 
undoubtedly did—while also serving other chosen corporate objectives.  
More importantly, whatever one's normative beliefs, or even prevailing 
non-law business norms, the question remains whether positive law does 
or should mandate a monistic rather than pluralistic approach to 
corporate purpose. 
 
3.  The Aftermath of eBay 
 
 The eBay opinion carries important implications for corporate 
theory and legislative reform as well as future doctrinal analysis by 
courts.  At the theory level, the opinion strongly manifests Berle's "trust" 
conception of the director-stockholder relationship as well as the current 
"principal-agent" conception of agency theory.327  In each of these views, 
the corporate enterprise is effectively disregarded in favor of focusing on 
the director-stockholder nexus.  Thus, notwithstanding that corporations 
are distinct legal persons,328 nor that eBay was not an end-of-the-
enterprise case like Revlon,329 ultimately, the Craigslist "corporate" 
mission did not matter to the Court, only stockholders did.  Lost then was 
any respect for the corporation as an institution serving interests that 
included—but more importantly, transcended—providing returns to 
investors.  In this way, although Delaware doctrine pays homage to an 
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satisfactory profits, what he called "profit-satisficing."  HENRY SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 204 
(1957). 
327See supra notes 232, 241 and accompanying text.  
328See Johnson, supra note 238, at 1158. 
329See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
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entity conception of the corporation in some settings,330 when corporate 
purpose was on the line as in eBay, the entity conception gave way.  
Doctrinally, this reflects a recurrent flaw of both the shareholder primacy 
and stakeholder theories of the "corporation"—neither, in fact, pays real 
heed to the corporation itself as a meaningful social-legal institution.331   
 Both shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories, moreover, 
like the eBay opinion, are grounded in an anthropology of humans that 
remains individualistic and self-interested.  Stakeholder theory may 
broaden the range of persons to be considered by corporate decision 
makers as claimants, but it does not advance a fundamentally different 
vision of human role and motivation within an institutional setting—i.e., 
that the participants' purpose, once in the firm, is to advance the larger, 
common good of the company's mission.  Nor, at the organizational 
level, does stakeholder theory articulate an overarching "corporate" 
purpose or mission.  Rather, in both shareholder primacy and stakeholder 
theories, the "corporation" is simply an analytical and semantic trope 
representing either shareholder interests, on the one hand, or those of 
multi-stakeholders, on the other.  Firm relationships in both theories 
remain bargained-for economic exchanges, not what Lynne Dallas calls 
"covenantal relationships" based on mutual commitment to the welfare of 
others and allegiance to a set of shared values and goals, as expressed in 
a truly "corporate" mission and purpose.332  Put another way, pursuit of an 
all-embracing corporate "common good" is ignored at both the 
organizational and individual level of theory.  This is odd, and a loss, 
given the very etymology of "company" as meaning "breaking bread" 
together,333 and of "corporation" meaning "body,"334 of which many parts 
are integral.  Apparently, under eBay's cramped view of corporate 
purpose—as in corporate theory generally—it is legally and conceptually 
incoherent to speak of Penn State, the New York Yankees, Craigslist, or 
any other of countless groups, as having interests that transcend those of 
particular constituencies.  Profound failures of modern corporate theory 
 
                                                                                                             
330William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 276 (1992). 
331See supra notes 229-233 and accompanying text. 
332Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Terminism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 356 (2012). 
333EDWIN S. HUNT & JAMES M. MURRAY, A HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN MEDIEVAL 
EUROPE, 1200-1550, at 13 (1990) ("[T]he daily dietary question was what to have with bread, 
cum panis, the etymological root of the word 'company' and its derivatives . . . ."). 
334See KLEIN'S COMPREHENSIVE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Unabridged, One-Volume ed. 1971) (Corporation is a derivate of the Latin 
infinitive, corporare, "to take into body"). 
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thus meant the Chancellor had little scholarly support in striking a blow 
for the validity of a genuinely corporate purpose. 
 As to Craigslist's pursuit of its avowed corporate purpose, the 
court's remedy of nullifying the Rights Plan under Unocal did nothing to 
change Craigslist's corporate mission.  eBay follows the iconic Dodge v. 
Ford Motor Co.335 in this regard, where, after a judicial scolding, 
dividends were ordered to be paid but Henry Ford still went his merry 
way hiring workers and pricing vehicles just as he pleased.336  The 
corporate purpose chosen by the properly-constituted governing officials 
was judicially rebuked in both cases, but not judicially altered.337  This is 
because judges do not and cannot make directors and officers maximize 
anything in the operation of a business venture.  They can only prohibit 
them from taking particular actions.338  Notwithstanding this constraint on 
judicial reach, the quite troubling question still arises as to whether it is 
at all appropriate for a judge, who is a government official, to command 
management of a private enterprise to advance (or refrain from) 
otherwise lawful activities.  This is particularly true where a savvy 
shareholder went in with its financial eyes wide open.339  In effect, eBay 
the crafty investor was fortuitously saved by a modern rendition of the 
slumbering ultra vires doctrine.340 
 The issue of corporate purpose, moreover, can potentially raise a 
troubling religious liberty concern, if not a First Amendment free 
exercise issue.341  This can be seen by looking at the privately held (like 
Craigslist) Chick-fil-A company, a business recently in the news for the 
views of its controlling shareholder-manager on gay marriage.342  That 
company famously is not open for business on Sundays.343  The reason is 
the founding family's religious belief that one should rest and not 
unnecessarily labor on Sundays.344  Moreover, Chick-fil-A headquarters 
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displays a plaque that clearly states the religious dimension of its 
corporate purpose:  to "glorify God by being a faithful steward . . . [and] 
have a positive influence on all . . . ."345  In addition, the company and its 
founder have given magnanimously to financially assist numerous 
disadvantaged groups and individuals.346  Thus, the company over the 
decades has pretty clearly failed to "maximize" profits or shareholder 
wealth, potentially having left hundreds of millions of dollars unearned 
by its decision to close all 1,600 stores on Sunday and to generously 
donate company funds. 
 At the urging of a hypothetical eBay-like future investor in 
Chick-fil-A, would—could—the Delaware Court of Chancery rule that 
that company wrongly refused to maximize profits and, therefore, should 
be ordered to sell chicken on Sundays?  Alternatively, what if the 
founders of Craigslist had founded that company and operated it as they 
do out of deeply-held religious convictions; could a Court then mandate 
a change in operations so as to achieve profit maximization?  To the 
extent that numerous companies are operated in a profit-seeking, but not 
profit-maximizing, manner out of religious belief, it would seem 
disturbing on religious liberty grounds for a state official to mandate that 
the governing constituents of a business must strive to make more 
money.347  This raises in a particularly troubling way the more general 
issue of why corporate officials of any philosophical bent should be 
heavy-handedly required by law to endeavor to earn as much money as 
 
                                                                                                             
345See Chick-fil-A at Independence Center Timeline Photos, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151480736938318&set=pb.55766183317.-
2207520000.1373591949.&type=3&theater (search "Click-fil-A at Independence Center"; 
then click on "Photos" hyperlink; and scroll to find "Corporate Purpose" plaque).  
346See Clare O'Connor, Meet the Cathys: Your Guide to the Billionaires Behind Chick-
fil-A, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2012), www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2012/08/03/meet-the-
cathys-your-guide-to-the-billionaires-behind-chick-fil-a/ ("WinShape [Foundation] is the 
vehicle through which Chick-fil-A, and by extension the Cathys, have made about $5 million 
of donations . . . with $1.9 million of that donated in 2010 to outfits including the Family 
Research Council and Marriage & Family Foundation.").  See also Partnerships and 
Programs, CHICK-FIL-A FOUNDATION, http://www.chick-fil-afoundation.org/how-we-
help/partnerships-programs (last visited June 20, 2013) (donating to various disadvantaged 
groups and individuals through the American Red Cross and The Salvation Army, among 
others). 
347The Author is not suggesting that such a mandate would violate the First 
Amendment, given the neutrality of application to all corporations, but only that religious 
liberty would thereby be substantially curbed in the corporate setting.  Compare Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 711-12 (2012) (First 
Amendment protects group communication of religious beliefs) (Alito, J., concurring), with 
Emp't Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding a law 
affecting religious activity when that law was equally applicable to all citizens). 
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possible, provided prospective investors are fully informed in advance of 
any investment, as eBay clearly was.  Lawmakers should not impose 
their own beliefs about the proper goals of business activity on the 
private sector but should themselves remain, ironically enough, 
"agnostic." 
 The modern corporate form after eBay may seem to offer less 
flexibility than the modern LLC form when it comes to business purpose.  
Delaware's LLC statute explicitly permits that type of entity to be used 
by both for-profit and not-for-profit purposes,348 as noted by certain 
commentators.349  By way of contrast, corporations, although they can 
conduct "any lawful business or purposes,"350 are, formally, one of only 
two types of corporations—i.e., for-profit or nonprofit351—unlike LLCs, 
where either for-profit or nonprofit ventures can be conducted in the 
same type of vehicle.352  The error and teaching of eBay, however, is to 
hold that to operate at all in the for-profit mode means that profits must 
be maximized rather than pursued (or enhanced, satisfied, and so on) in 
some manner and to some degree.  The for-profit corporation statute 
itself, however, includes no such requirement.353  Thus, in the LLC 
setting, there likewise can be no assurance after eBay that for-profit 
LLCs may refrain from maximizing profits, if they elect to pursue profits 
at all. 
 One legislative response to eBay in numerous states already is 
the adoption of legislation authorizing the formation of benefit 
corporations.354  These so-called "B Corps" are for-profit companies that 
seek to make profits while also serving environmental/social 
objectives.355  They do not need to maximize profits.356  Proponents of this 
legislation routinely read the eBay decision as requiring profit 
 
                                                                                                             
348See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 (2012). 
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353See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2012). 
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maximization357 and, thus, that decision comprises a key reason for 
promulgating a new "dual mission" form of business vehicle. 
 Another legislative approach to accommodate mixed purpose 
business vehicles can be seen in Oregon's corporate statute.358  Oregon 
permits a corporation's articles of incorporation to include a provision 
authorizing or directing the conduct of the business in an 
environmentally and socially responsible manner.359  Prospective 
investors thus know from the outset that such a corporation may not be 
maximizing profits in all circumstances and they can invest or refrain 
accordingly.  In this way, as with benefit corporation legislation, states 
are permitting, but not mandating, a pluralistic approach to corporate 
purpose rather than decreeing a singular objective.  Market and social 
forces, not law, can then work to determine which models succeed.360 
 Another statutory approach for Delaware in the aftermath of 
eBay, besides its new benefit corporation statute, would be to more 
clearly adopt a statutory default rule on the profit-seeking/profit-
maximizing issue within its business corporation statute.361  The most 
likely rule, given widespread corporate norms and conventions,362 would 
be profit maximization (or, perhaps profit "enhancement").  This should 
be coupled with a permitted opt-out of profit maximization (or 
enhancement) in favor of an alternative and clearly specified purpose or 
combination of purposes.363  In this way, the notion of the corporation as 
a meaningful social-economic institution serving its own overarching 
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because they sought to advance a public purpose, not simply facilitate private financial gain.  
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mission distinct from that of any of its constituencies—investors or 
otherwise—could be restored and brought into legal reality.  And as 
currently is the case in Canada, the director duty of loyalty to advance 
the corporate purpose would be owed to the corporation itself, not to the 
stockholders.364  Furthermore, this reform would advance the laudable 
goal of facilitating greater institutional pluralism in the corporate 
realm,365 thereby avoiding the overly sharp current dichotomy (and 
typology) between for-profit and nonprofit corporations.  As recently 
observed by the Delaware Supreme Court:  "[I]t is hardly absurd for the 
General Assembly to design a system promoting maximum business 
entity diversity."366 
IV.  CONCLUSION   
 Delaware corporate law is unsettled on two rather basic issues 
addressed in this Article, i.e., the precise reach but also the continuing 
utility of the business judgment rule as now formulated, and whether a 
narrow corporate purpose is and should be mandated.  Unsettledness, to 
varying degrees, is an inherent feature of dynamic lawmaking in the 
common law system.  Delaware law, after all, does not design rules for a 
business system that itself is static; consequently, law itself cannot be 
static, and lawmaking mechanisms must themselves be highly adaptive.  
We saw this very clearly in a highly compressed time period in 2012 
when doubt was raised as to the existence of default fiduciary duties in 
LLCs, a doubt quickly dispelled by the General Assembly.367 
 But doctrinal flux can also operate in a narrow band and over a 
longer, Kondratiev-like cycle.368  We see this where baseline issues 
remain contested and where thoughtful judges, lawyers, and professors 
retain a lingering discomfort as to rule optimality and social congruence.  
This Article suggests that while the policy underpinnings of the business 
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judgment rule remain sound, Delaware's deployment of the rule is not.  
Delaware's rule has outworn its usefulness for analyzing director conduct 
for the simple if startling reason that it is doctrinal surplusage; and for 
controlling shareholders, the rule is simply inapt and does nothing but 
complicate the analysis.  The key question for all corporate fiduciaries, 
like all other fiduciaries, is whether they did or did not breach their duties 
in a way that caused harm.  Delaware's rule is a prolix, doctrinal vestige 
wrongly pressed into service as a unifying vehicle for analyzing this 
straightforward issue.  Such over-refined complexity in intellectual 
thought typically precedes a much-needed, simplifying paradigm shift.369  
Delaware judges should fundamentally alter the "map" of fiduciary 
analysis by showcasing fiduciary duties and downplaying the business 
judgment rule.  They can begin doing so by not adopting the rule in 
analyzing officer and shareholder conduct.  And for directors, the policy 
of no-substantive review central to duty of care analysis can easily 
accomplish the goal of deferential review in a more streamlined doctrinal 
manner.     
 As to corporate purpose, in a complex modern economy 
committed to free choice, ingenuity, experimentation, and diverse social 
patterns, Delaware law should not mandate a narrow money-maximizing 
purpose.  As in the tumultuous 1980s, when Delaware judges wisely 
refused to endorse a view that corporations existed solely to enrich 
shareholders,370 common law judges should not dictate that objective 
today.  Such a view, although dominant in corporate law theory, is at 
odds with broader social expectations of business conduct in the modern 
world and it undermines much-needed judicial legitimacy in the business 
law area.  Delaware law should retain its enabling quality and remain 
agnostic on this issue. 
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